In this paper, we study interest rate feedback rules whereby the nominal interest rate is set as an increasing function of the ination rate and characterize conditions under which such rules generate multiple equilibria. We show that these conditions depend not only on the monetary-scal regime (as emphasized in the scal theory of the price level) but also on the way in which money is assumed to enter preferences and technology. We analyze this issue in exible and sticky price environments. We provide a number of examples in which, contrary to what is commonly believed, active monetary policy in combination with a scal policy that preserves government solvency gives rise to multiple equilibria and passive monetary policy renders the equilibrium unique. JEL Classication Numbers: E52, E31, E63.
Introduction
Recent developments in monetary economics have emphasized the link between the degree to which monetary and scal policy respond to endogenous variables such as the ination rate or the stock of public debt and macroeconomic stability. 1 Perhaps the best-known result in this literature is that if scal solvency is preserved under all circumstances, then an active monetary policy, that is, a policy that aggressively ghts ination by raising the nominal interest rate by more than the increase in ination, stabilizes the real side of the economy b y ensuring the uniqueness of equilibrium, whereas a passive monetary policy, that is, a policy that underreacts to ination by raising the nominal interest rate by less than the observed increase in ination, destabilizes it by giving rise to expectations-driven uctuations. In this paper, we show that whether a particular monetary{scal regime generates multiple equilibria depends crucially on the way in which money is assumed to enter preferences and technology. In particular, the paper highlights the fact that regardless of the stance of scal policy, an active monetary policy does not necessarily bring about the determinacy of equilibrium.
In the context of a exible-price, money-in-the-utility-function model, we show that the standard result holds in an endowment economy in which consumption and real balances are Edgeworth-complements in preferences in the sense that the marginal utility of consumption is increasing in real balances. However, the opposite result|i.e., uniqueness of the equilibrium occurs under passive monetary policy and multiple equilibria occur under active monetary policy|obtains if consumption and real balances are Edgeworthsubstitutes. More importantly, the opposite result also obtains in an economy in which money enters in the production function, even if real balances and consumption are Edgeworth-complements in preferences.
We also analyze economies with nominal rigidities. Specically, w e study two alternative models of price stickiness: the Rotemberg (1982) model with convex cost of price adjustment and the Calvo (1983) model of staggered price setting. We show that when money enters in the production function, active monetary policy may render the equilibrium indeterminate regardless of the stance of scal policy. The nding that the equilibrium may be indeterminate under active monetary when scal policy does not guarantee solvency of the government under all circumstances is of particular importance because in economies in which money aects real variables only through aggregate demand, no equilibrium exists locally under this type of monetary-scal regime.
The common notion that active monetary policy is tantamount to aggregate stability is further challenged when one does not restrict the analysis to local stability. In sticky-price environments, we nd that if money enters in the production function, active monetary policy may give rise to a continuum of equilibria in each of which real variables converge to a deterministic cycle.
Finally, w e extend the analysis to feedback rules in which the interest rate depends not only on current ination but also on past or expected future rates of ination. We nd that the results described above are generally robust to this extension. Backward-looking feedback rules tend to reduce the range of parameter values for which the equilibrium is indeterminate and forward-looking rules tend to increase it.
The remainder of the paper is organized in four sections. Section 2 studies a exible-price economy. Section 3 characterizes local and periodic equilibria in the Rotemberg sticky-price model. Section 4 extends the results to backward-and forward-looking interest rate feedback rules and to an economy with Calvo-type price staggering. Section 5 concludes.
A exible-price model
In this section, we study the determinacy of equilibrium under alternative monetary and scal policies in a exible-price model in which ination may aect consumption and production as in Calvo (1979) . 1 See, for example, Leeper (1991) , Sims (1994 Sims ( , 1997 , Woodford (1994 Woodford ( , 1995 Woodford ( , 1996 , Clarida, Gal , and Gertler (1997) , and Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (1997) .
2 The monetary-scal regimes analyzed by Calvo (1979) are dierent from those studied in this paper. Calvo focuses on monetary policies whereby the central bank pegs either the money growth rate or the ination rate in combination with a scal policy that species zero public debt at all times implying full monetization of primary decits. By contrast, as will be explained in detail shortly, w e analyze interest rate feedback rules in combination with scal policies in which the real primary surplus is either constant or proportional to the stock of real government liabilities. Another example of a study of price level determination in a model with money in the production function is Taylor (1977) . Like Calvo, Taylor considers monetary policy regimes that are dierent from those studied in this paper. However, unlike Calvo, Taylor conducts his analysis in the context
The household
The household's lifetime utility function is given by U = Z 1 0 e rt u(c; m np ) dt (1) where r > 0 denotes the rate of time preference, c consumption, m np M np =P real balances held for nonproduction purposes, M np nominal money balances held for non-production purposes, and P the nominal price level. The instant utility function u(; ) satises assumption 1, which implies that c and m np are normal goods.
Assumption 1 u(; ) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and satises u cc u cm u c =u m < 0 and u mm u cm u m =u c < 0.
We consider two alternative production technologies: (i) output is produced with real balances held by the household for production purposes, m p M p =P, where M p denotes nominal money balances held for production purposes, and (ii) output is equal to a positive constant. Formally, the production technology, y(m p ), satises either assumption 2 or assumption 2 0 .
Assumption 2 y(m p ) is positive, strictly increasing, strictly concave, lim m p !0 y 0 (m p ) = 1 , and lim m p !1 y 0 (m p ) = 0 . Assumption 2 0 y(m p ) is a positive constant.
In addition to money, the household can hold nominal bonds, B, which pay the nominal interest rate R > 0. Letting a (M np +M p +B)=P denote the household's real nancial wealth, real lump-sum taxes, and _ P = P the ination rate, the household's instant budget constraint can be written as _ a = ( R ) a R ( m np + m p ) + y ( m p ) c :
The household chooses sequences for c, m np , m p 0 and a so as to maximize (1) subject to (2) and the following no-Ponzi-game condition 
with m p0 dm p =dR < 0. Alternatively, assumption 2 0 , equation (5), and the fact that R > 0 imply that m p = m p0 = 0 . Using equation (6) and assumption 1, m np can be expressed as a function of consumption and the nominal interest rate that is increasing in c and decreasing in R: m np = m np (c; R):
of a non-optimizing framework.
The government
We assume that monetary policy takes the form of an interest rate feedback rule whereby the nominal interest rate is set as an increasing function of the ination rate. Specically, w e assume that R = (); (11) where () is continuous, non-decreasing, and strictly positive and there exists at least one > r such that ( ) = r + . F ollowing Leeper (1991) , we refer to monetary policy as active i f 0 > 1 and as passive if 0 < 1. 
Because the nominal value of initial government liabilities, A(0), is predetermined, the initial condition a(0) must satisfy
We classify scal policies into two categories: Ricardian scal policies and non-Ricardian ones. Ricardian scal policies are those that ensure that the present discounted value of total government liabilities converges to zero|that is, equation (8) is satised|under all possible, equilibrium or o-equilibrium, paths of endogenous variables such as the price level, the money supply, ination, or the nominal interest rate.
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Throughout the paper, we restrict attention to one particular Ricardian scal policy that takes the form + R(m np + m p ) = a (14) where the sequence is chosen arbitrarily by the government subject to the constraint that it is positive and bounded below b y > 0. This policy states that consolidated government revenues, that is, tax revenues plus interest savings from the issuance of money, are always higher than a certain fraction of total government liabilities. A special case of this type of policy is a balanced-budget rule whereby tax revenues are equal to interest payments on the debt, which results when = R (provided R is bounded away from zero). To see that the scal policy given by (14) (12) and (14), this expression can be written as _ x = x, which implies that x converges monotonically to zero.
We will also analyze a particular non-Ricardian scal policy consisting of an exogenous path for lump-sum taxes = :
Equilibrium
In equilibrium the goods market must clear
Using equations (9){(11) and (16) to replace m p , m np , R, and c in equation (4), can be expressed as a function of , = ()
3 Our denition of Ricardian scal policy is dierent from the one given in Woodford (1995) . In the rst place, Woodford uses the term Ricardian to refer to monetary-scal regimes rather than to scal regimes alone. Second, according to Woodford, Ricardian regimes are combinations of monetary and scal policies that ensure that the present discounted value of public debt, not total government liabilities, converges to zero. Thus, for example, a balanced-budget rule in combination with an interest rate peg is Ricardian according to our denition but not according to Woodford's (see Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe, 1997) . Also, Ricardian scal policies are not necessarily passive in the sense of Leeper (1991) 
Given an equilibrium sequence for , equations (9) Denition 2 (Real and Nominal Indeterminacy) The equilibrium displays real indeterminacy if there exists an innite number of equilibrium sequences fg. The equilibrium exhibits nominal indeterminacy if for any equilibrium sequence fg, there exists an innite number of initial price levels P(0) > 0 consistent with a perfect-foresight equilibrium.
In the remainder of this section, we restrict the analysis to equilibria in which the ination rate converges asymptotically to a steady-state value, , which is dened as a constant v alue of that solves (19) , that is, a solution to r + = (). By assumption, exists and is greater than r.
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Under a Ricardian scal policy, the set of equilibrium conditions includes equation (22). Given a sequence fg satisfying (19) and an initial price level P(0) > 0, equations (20) and (22) can be used to construct a pair of sequences fa; g. Because the scal policy is Ricardian, the transversality condition (21) is always satised. If instead the scal authority follows the non-Ricardian scal policy given in (15), combining (13), (20), and (21) yields
which given A(0) > 0 and a sequence for converging to uniquely determines the initial price level P(0).
The above analysis demonstrates that for the class of monetary-scal regimes studied in this paper nominal determinacy depends only on scal policy and not on monetary policy|a result that has been emphasized in the recent literature on the scal determination of the price level and that we summarize in the following proposition: Proposition 2.1 If scal policy is Ricardian, the equilibrium exhibits nominal indeterminacy. Under the non-Ricardian scal policy given by (15), the equilibrium displays nominal determinacy.
By contrast, the determinacy of the real allocation is independent of scal policy but depends on the stance of monetary policy and on the particular way in which ination aects production and consumption.
To see this, consider solutions to equation (19) . If 0 ( ) and 1 0 ( ) are of opposite sign, any initial ination rate near the steady state will give rise to an ination trajectory that converges to . If, on the other hand, 0 ( ) and 1 0 ( ) are of the same sign, the only sequence of ination rates that converges asymptotically to is one in which the ination rate is constant and equal to . If 0 () = 0 for all , then equations (18) and (19) imply that and are constant. Thus, under a pure interest rate peg the economy exhibits real determinacy.
To understand the conditions under which the model displays real indeterminacy, it is instructive to consider the following two polar cases. Consider rst the case in which preferences are separable in consumption and money (u cm = 0) and money is productive (assumption 2 holds). In this case, equation (18) this result is as follows. Suppose rms initially hold more real balances for production purposes than in the steady state. This will happen only if the nominal interest rate is below its steady-state level. By the interest rate feedback rule, the ination rate has to be below its steady-state value as well. If monetary policy is active, the decline in the ination rate is accompanied by a decline in the real interest rate, R , which in turn induces negative consumption growth. Since in equilibrium consumption equals output, and output is an increasing function of real balances, real balances for production purposes will be expected to decline. Therefore, the initial increase in real balances is reversed and the resulting trajectory is consistent with equilibrium. If, on the other hand, monetary policy is passive, the decline in the ination rate is associated with a rise in the real interest rate, and thus consumption will be expected to grow, moving output and real balances even further away from the steady state. Such a trajectory for real balances would not be remain bounded in a neighborhood around the steady state and thus would not be consistent with an equilibrium in which ination converges to . This result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2 Suppose preferences are separable in consumption and money (u cm = 0) and money is productive (assumption 2 holds), then if monetary policy is active ( 0 ( ) > 1), the equilibrium displays real indeterminacy, whereas if monetary policy is passive ( 0 ( ) < 1), then the only perfect-foresight equilibrium in which the real allocation converges to the steady state is the steady state itself.
Consider now the case in which money is not productive, that is, assumption 2 0 holds. In this case, equation (18) implies that 0 = 0 u cm m np R which is positive i f u cm < 0, that is, if consumption and money are Edgeworth-substitutes, and is negative i f u cm > 0, that is, if consumption and money are complements.
Thus the economy displays real indeterminacy if monetary policy is active and consumption and money are substitutes or if monetary policy is passive and consumption and money are complements.
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The intuition behind this indeterminacy result is as follows. Consider the case that monetary policy is passive and u cm > 0.
Suppose that real balances for non-productive purposes are increased above their steady-state level. Because the money demand function of the household is decreasing in the nominal interest rate and consumption is constant, it follows that the nominal interest rate has to be below its steady-state level. At the same time, passive monetary policy implies that the decline in the nominal interest rate is associated with an increase in the real interest rate. In response to the increase in the real interest rate agents will lower the growth rate of the marginal utility of consumption. With consumption constant and u cm > 0, this requires that the growth rate of real balances be negative. Thus real balances will return to their steady level and this trajectory is consistent with equilibrium. The next two propositions summarize these results. Proposition 2.3 Suppose that money is not productive (assumption 2 0 holds) and consumption and money are Edgeworth-substitutes (u cm < 0). Then, if monetary policy is active ( 0 ( ) > 1), the real allocation is indeterminate, and if monetary policy is passive ( 0 ( ) < 1), then the only perfect-foresight equilibrium in which the real allocation converges to the steady state is the steady state itself.
Proposition 2.4 Suppose that money is not productive (assumption 2 0 holds) and consumption and money are Edgeworth-complements (u cm > 0). Then, if monetary policy is passive ( 0 ( ) < 1), the real allocation is indeterminate, and if monetary policy is active ( 0 ( ) > 1), then the only perfect-foresight equilibrium in which the real allocation converges to the steady state is the steady state itself.
Combining the case of non-productive money (assumption 2 0 ) with preferences that are separable in consumption and real balances (u cm = 0 ) results in the continuous time version of the economy analyzed in Leeper (1991) . In this case equation (18) implies that is constant. It then follows that , R and m np are also constant, and the only equilibrium real allocation is the steady state. This result diers from that obtained by Leeper who nds that under passive monetary policy the ination rate is indeterminate. The dierence stems from the fact that in Leeper's discrete-time model the nominal interest rate in period t is assumed to be a function of the change in the price level between periods t 1 and t, whereas in the continuous time model analyzed here, the ination rate is the right hand side derivative of the price level, so its discrete-time counterpart is better approximated by the change in the price level between periods t and t + 1 . In fact, it is straightforward to show that if in Leeper's discrete-time model the feedback rule is assumed to be forward looking|that is, R t = (P t+1 =P t )|the equilibrium displays real determinacy. Table 1 summarizes the combinations of preference, technology, and monetary policy specications under which real indeterminacy arises in the exible-price model. The second row of the table highlights the main result of this section, namely, that, contrary to what is often asserted, real indeterminacy may arise under active monetary policy. Most existing studies have restricted attention to the case in which money is not productive (y 0 = 0) and money and consumption goods either are complements in preferences or enter the utility function in a separable fashion (u cm 0). As a result these studies have arrived at the potentially misleading conclusion that an active monetary policy stabilizes the economy b y bringing about real determinacy.
We should also note that the results on local uniqueness under active monetary policy should be interpreted with care from a global perspective. As pointed out above, if there exists a steady state with 0 ( ) > 1, then since () is assumed to be continuous and strictly positive, there must also exist a steady state with 0 < 1, which can be indeterminate precisely under those assumptions that assure local determinacy at the steady state :
3 A sticky-price model
In this section, we extend the model developed in the previous section to allow for nominal rigidities. Following Rotemberg (1982) , we i n troduce price stickiness by assuming that the household{rm unit operates in imperfectly competitive product markets and dislikes changing the price it charges for the goods it produces. 
In addition, rms are subject to the constraint that given the price they charge, their sales are demanddetermined
The household chooses sequences for c j , m npj , m pj , P j 0, and a j so as to maximize (24) subject to (28) and (29), the demand for real balances for non-production purposes can be expressed as m npj = m np (c j ; R )
which b y assumption 1 is increasing in c j and decreasing in R.
Equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium all household{rm units choose identical sequences for consumption, asset holdings, and prices. Thus, c j = c, m pj = m p , m npj = m np , a j = a, P j = P, j = , j = , and j = .
In addition, the goods markets clear and the no-Ponzi-game restriction holds with equality, that is, equations (8) and (16) are part of the equilibrium conditions. Using (11), (16) 
Equation (35) Denition 3 (Perfect-foresight equilibrium in the sticky-price economy) In the sticky-price economy, a perfect-foresight equilibrium is a set of sequences f; ; ; ag satisfying (37){(40) and either (15) if the scal regime is non-Ricardian or (41) if the scal regime is Ricardian, given a(0).
Given the equilibrium sequences f; ; ; ag, the corresponding equilibrium sequences fc; m np ; m p ; R g are uniquely determined by (11), (16), (34), and (36).
Ricardian scal policy In this case, the equilibrium conditions include equation (41). Given a pair of sequences f;g, equations (39) and (41) can be used to construct time paths for a and . Because the scal policy is Ricardian, the sequences f;agsatisfy the transversality condition (40). Thus any pair of sequences f; g satisfying (37) and (38) can be supported as a perfect-foresight equilibrium. and can be approximated by the solutions to the following linearization of (37) and (38) If at the particular steady state considered monetary policy is passive ( 0 ( ) < 1), the determinant o f A , given by A 21 u c (1 0 ), is negative, implying that A has one positive real root and one negative real root. Since both and are jump variables, it follows that there exists a neighborhood around the steady state such that for any initial (0) there exists a (0) in that neighborhood such that the trajectories of and implied by (42) will converge asymptotically to the steady state. The following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 3.1 If scal policy is Ricardian and monetary policy is passive ( 0 ( ) < 1), then there exists a continuum of perfect-foresight equilibria in which and converge asymptotically to the steady state ( ; ) .
Under active monetary policy ( 0 ( ) > 1) the determinant o f A is positive and hence the real parts of its eigenvalues have the same sign. If the trace of A, given by A 22 , is negative, then the real parts of the roots are negative, which implies that near the steady state there exists an innite number of perfect-foresight equilibria converging to the steady state. If, on the other hand, the trace of A is positive, both eigenvalues have positive real parts, and therefore the only perfect-foresight equilibrium converging to the steady state is the steady state itself. We formally state these results in the following proposition. T o illustrate that either of these two cases is possible consider the simple case that the instant utility function is separable in consumption and money and logarithmic in consumption, so that u c c = 1 . In this case, the trace of A is given by To facilitate comparison to recent studies on the macroeconomic eects of alternative i n terest rate feedback rules continue to assume that the instant utility function is log-linear in consumption. In this case, equations (37) and (38) are qualitatively equivalent to the IS and aggregate supply equations arising from a Calvo-type sticky-price model in which money does not enter the production function, like (a continuous time version of) Woodford (1996) , Bernanke and Woodford (1997), or Clarida, Gal , and Gertler (1997) , with one important exception: in our model the aggregate supply equation features an ambiguous partial derivative of _ with respect to given by r + (1+) 0 R whereas in the models just cited this derivative is unambiguously positive and equal to r.
If the partial derivative o f _ with respect to is positive, then A 22 is positive and by propositions 3.1 and 3.2 the equilibrium is locally indeterminate under passive monetary policy and is locally determinate under active monetary policy, that is, in this case our ndings coincide with those reported in, for example, Clarida, Gal , and Gertler (1997) . On the other hand, if the partial derivative of _ with respect to is negative, that is, A 22 < 0, then equilibrium is indeterminate not only under passive but also under active monetary policy. By comparison, in a continuous time version of the sticky-price model just cited, indeterminacy can never obtain under active monetary policy. 10 This dierence in results is important because it calls into question the policy recommendation implicit in the analysis of previous papers that active monetary policy is stabilizing.
Periodic perfect-foresight equilibria
So far we h a v e restricted attention to perfect-foresight equilibria in which f; g converge asymptotically to f ; g . W e now investigate the existence of perfect-foresight equilibria in which and converge asymptotically to a deterministic cycle. Consider an economy with preferences given by u(c; m np ) = ( 1 denote the value of a at which the trace of A is equal to zero. Consider parameter congurations for which a > 1. As a crosses a from below, the real parts of the two complex roots of A change sign from positive to negative. This is the standard case of a Hopf bifurcation, which implies that generically (i.e., if the system is non-linear), there will exist a family of cycles for a either in a left or in a right neighborhood of a.
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Furthermore, if the cycle is to the left of a where the steady state is unstable (i.e., the bifurcation point is supercritical), the cycle will be attracting. The implication is that if the bifurcation is supercritical, any trajectory f; g that starts out in the neighborhood of f ; g will converge to a cycle, 9 In the context of a discrete-time, exible-price, cash-in-advance economy with cash and credit goods, Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (1997) obtain a similar result, namely, the perfect-foresight equilibrium is indeterminate for passive and very active monetary policy and is determinate for moderately active policies. 10 Technically, this follows from the fact that in this case A 22 is necesarily positive, so that if monetary policy is active, both eigenvalues of the matrix A have positive real parts.
11 Because a linear rule dened for all possible values of would yield negative nominal interest rates for some , w e do not require the linear specication to hold globally. 12 The Hopf Bifurcation Theorem postulates the existence of a family of cycles, which in the pure linear system pile up at the bifurcation value a and create a center: any nonlinearity will spread them out to either a left or a right neighborhood of a. Generically in the non-linear case the amplitude of the cycle varies continuously with a a and is zero at a = a .
so that the equilibrium is indeterminate. The following proposition provides simple conditions under which a supercritical Hopf bifurcation exists. Proof: See the appendix.
The implications of the results obtained under sticky prices and Ricardian scal policy can be summarized as follows. It is often argued (typically in the context of discrete-time models) that under scal policies which guarantee the solvency of the government, a moderately active monetary policy, that is, a policy such that 0 ( ) > 1 but below a certain threshold, is stabilizing in the sense that it ensures nominal and real determinacy. 13 However, propositions 3.2 and 3.3 show that even moderately active monetary policies may not eliminate the possibility of real indeterminacy in a sticky-price economy, and corollary 1 gives sucient conditions for indeterminacy under any active monetary policy. In addition, as noted in section 2, if the nominal interest rate rule is positive, non-decreasing, and continuous for all , the existence of a steady state at which monetary policy is active implies the existence of another steady state at which monetary policy is passive, and which b y proposition 3.1 is necessarily indeterminate.
Non-ricardian scal policy
Suppose now that the government follows the non-Ricardian scal policy described in equation (15), that is, a scal policy whereby the time path of real lump-sum taxes is exogenous. Using (15) 
As before, we restrict attention to equilibria in which f; g converge to a steady-state ( ; ). It is clear from equation (44) that sequences f; g that converge to ( ; ) will in general be associated with sequences for a that grow asymptotically at the rate ( ) = r > 0, thus violating the transversality condition (40). As a consequence equations (44) and (40) impose restrictions on the set of sequences f; g that are consistent with a perfect-foresight equilibrium of the type we are considering. Specically, only sequences f; g converging to the steady state ( ; ) that imply (via equation (44) 
where A is dened in (42) and is a one by t w o v ector whose elements are the steady-state derivatives of R(m np + m p ) with respect to and .
Since the Jacobian in (45) is quasi-diagonal, its three eigenvalues are given by the two eigenvalues of the matrix A and r > 0. Because a is the only non-jump variable of the system, there exist multiple equilibria converging to the steady state if and only if both roots of A have negative real parts. Since|as pointed out above| 0 > 1 is a necessary and sucient conditions for both eigenvalues of A to be of the same sign, the possibility o f m ultiple equilibrium paths f; g converging asymptotically to the steady-state 13 See for example, Bernanke and Woodford (1997) , Clarida, Gal , and Gertler (1997) The result contained in proposition 3.4 is similar to the one obtained in Woodford (1996) in the context of a discrete-time Calvo-type sticky-price model without money in the production function. What distinguishes our ndings from previous studies is the result that the equilibrium can be locally indeterminate under nonRicardian scal policy (proposition 3.5). As pointed out above, in a continuous-time version of Woodford (1996) , the trace of A is positive and equal to r, so that at least one eigenvalue of A is always positive. Thus, in such a model indeterminacy can never arise under non-Ricardian scal policy.
Periodic perfect-foresight equilibria
In the case that monetary policy is active and both eigenvalues of A are positive, there may exist bounded equilibria that converge to a stable cycle around the steady state. Note that for the system (37), (38), and (44) the dynamics of f; g are independent o f a , and thus the analysis of periodic equilibria of the previous section still applies. For example, under the preference and technology specication of the economy described in proposition 3.3, if cycles exist, any initial condition for (; ) in the neighborhood of the steady state will converge to a cycle. To assure that a does not explode, however, we m ust restrict ourselves to a one dimensional manifold in f; g : This follows because while cycles restricted to the f; g plane are attracting, in the three dimensional space the cycle in f; ; ag will have only a two dimensional stable manifold: initial values of and will have t o b e c hosen to assure that the triple f; ; ag converges to the cycle and a remains bounded. Table 2 summarizes the results of this section. It shows the combinations of scal and monetary policies for which the real allocation is indeterminate in the sticky-price model. The last two r o ws of the table illustrate a central point of the paper, namely that active monetary policy need not guarantee real determinacy. In fact, in our model the only monetary-scal regime that generates real determinacy without any further restrictions on the parameters governing the speed of nominal adjustment is one in which monetary policy is passive. (48) The rest of the equilibrium conditions are identical to those obtained in section 2. In particular, we h a v e that 
Using equation (46) to eliminate from (48) and (49) When money enters only through production or only through preferences with consumption and money being Edgeworth substitutes, 0 is positive. Thus, the equilibrium is always locally determinate under passive monetary policy, a s w as the case under purely contemporaneous feedback rules. However, contrary to the case of purely contemporaneous feedback rules, if monetary policy is active, then equilibria in which R converges to its steady state may not exist. To see this, note that in this case the determinant o f J is positive, so that the real parts of the roots of J have the same sign as the trace of J. However, the trace of J can have either sign. If the trace is positive, then no equilibrium converging to the steady state exists. If it is negative, the equilibrium is indeterminate. For large enough values of 0 the trace of J becomes negative. Thus, highly active monetary policy induces indeterminacy. Furthermore, the larger the emphasis the feedback rule places on contemporaneous ination (q close to one) or the lower the weight it assigns to ination rates observed in the distant past (b large), the smaller is the minimum value of 0 beyond which the equilibrium becomes indeterminate. In the limit, as q approaches unity or b approaches innity, the equilibrium becomes indeterminate under every active monetary policy, which is the result obtained under purely contemporaneous feedback rules. On the other hand, as the monetary policy becomes purely backward looking (q ! 0), no equilibrium in which R converges to its steady state exists under active monetary policy.
We conclude that the more backward-looking the feedback rule is, the less likely it is that active monetary policy renders the equilibrium locally indeterminate. This is not to say, however, that backward-looking behavior in the conduct of monetary policy makes it more likely for the equilibrium to be determinate under active monetary policy. Instead, backward-looking behavior makes a range of active monetary policies for which the equilibrium is indeterminate under purely contemporaneous behavior inconsistent with the existence of equilibria in which the real allocation converges to its steady state.
Consider now a feedback rule whereby the nominal interest rate responds to changes in contemporaneous and expected future ination. Specically, assume that the feedback rule takes the form
where f is a weighted average of expected future rates of ination and is dened as active monetary policy ensures local uniqueness when the feedback rule depends only on current ination, but may induce indeterminacy if the feedback rule depends on current and future expected ination. Thus, we conclude that the more forward-looking monetary policy is, the more likely it is that active monetary policy renders the equilibrium locally indeterminate.
It is noteworthy that the dichotomy between nominal and real determinacy that appears when the feedback rule depends only on current ination survives under backward-and forward-looking policies. If the real allocation is locally unique, then the determinacy of the price level depends exclusively on scal policy. As under purely contemporaneous monetary feedback rules, the price level is determinate if scal policy is non-Ricardian and is indeterminate if scal policy is Ricardian.
Sticky-price model
The pattern that arises under sticky prices is that if monetary policy is active, the introduction of a backwardlooking component in monetary policy makes determinacy more likely, whereas a forward-looking component where m p (; R) results from replacing () by R in equation (35) and is decreasing in and increasing (decreasing) in R if u cm is negative (positive).
Consider rst a backward-looking feedback rule like the one described in equations (46) and (47). Combining these two equations to eliminate p and linearizing around the steady state yields
Using this expression and linearizing equations (53) and (54), the evolution of , , and R is described by Because p is predetermined and R is a function of and p , it follows that a linear combination of and R R is predetermined. In addition, is a jump variable. Assume rst that scal policy is Ricardian. Then the local determinacy of the perfect-foresight equilibrium is governed by the eigenvalues of A. Specically, the equilibrium is indeterminate if the real part of at least two roots of A are negative. Assume that monetary policy is active ( 0 > 1). We found in section 3 that under a purely contemporaneous feedback rule, the combination of Ricardian scal policy and active monetary policy can render the real allocation either locally determinate or indeterminate, depending on parameter values. By contrast, if the feedback rule is suciently backward looking (q;b!0), the equilibrium is always unique. If scal policy is non-Ricardian, then the local determinacy of the perfect-foresight equilibrium is governed by the eigenvalues of a four-by-four Jacobian matrix dening the law of motion of , , R, and a. One of the eigenvalues of this matrix is r > 0 and the other three are those of the matrix A. Because a and a combination of R and are predetermined, the equilibrium is locally unique if and only if the Jacobian has exactly two roots with positive real parts. If monetary policy is active, it follows from our previous analysis that the Jacobian matrix has either one or three roots with negative real parts. Thus, local determinacy is impossible. This is the same result as under purely contemporaneous feedback rules. However, if the feedback rule is strongly backward-looking (b; q ! 0) then no equilibrium in which the real allocation converges to its steady state exists. If monetary policy is passive, the determinant of the Jacobian is positive, implying that there exist either two or zero roots with negative real parts. Thus, as in the case of purely contemporaneous feedback rules, local indeterminacy is impossible. However, unlike the case of contemporaneous rules, under backward-looking monetary policy an equilibrium may not exist. Finally, consider the case of a forward-looking feedback rule like the one described by equations (51) and (52). We will limit the analysis to the case of Ricardian scal policy, leaving the non-Ricardian case to the reader. The law of motion of the vector ( R ) is described by a Jacobian matrix that is identical to A with b replaced by d. In addition, the three variables of the system are non-predetermined. Therefore, as long as the Jacobian has at least one root with a negative real part, the perfect-foresight equilibrium is locally indeterminate. Local determinacy requires that all three roots have positive real parts.
Suppose rst that monetary policy is active. Under contemporaneous feedback rules, the equilibrium can be locally determinate or indeterminate. The same result obtains under forward-looking rules. However, if the rule is strongly forward-looking (d; q ! 0) the equilibrium is necessarily locally indeterminate. To see this, note that in this case the trace of the Jacobian tends to r > 0 and that B tends to u c A 21 < 0, so that the pattern of signs in the scheme (55) is + ++. If monetary policy is passive, then the determinant i s negative, therefore, as in the case of purely contemporaneous rules, the equilibrium is locally indeterminate.
A model with Calvo-Yun-type price staggering
In this extension, we develop a continuous-time, money-in-the-production function version of Yun's (1996) sticky-price model. 16 We show that it implies equilibrium conditions that are qualitatively identical to those obtained under the Rotemberg model. Thus, all the results on local determinacy obtained in section 3 carry over to environments with Calvo-Yun price staggering.
Households
The representative household's lifetime utility function is assumed to be of the form 
Firms
The production technology and market structure are identical to those assumed in section 3. The dierence with the Rotemberg model stems from the source of nominal rigidities. Following Calvo (1983) , suppose that a rm can change the nominal price of the good it produces only when it receives a price-change signal. If the rm does not receive a signal, then its price is assumed to increase automatically at the steady-state ination rate. The probability of receiving a price-change signal between periods t and s > t is assumed to be given by 1 e (s t) ; > 0 : (59) Consider the problem faced by rm j that receives a price-change signal at time t. The expected stream of prots associated with a particular price P j (t) i s g i v en by (P j The expression within square brackets represents prots at time s in the event that the rm has not received a price-change signal between times t and s. We ignore the prots corresponding to the events in which the rm receives a price-change signal after time t because they are irrelevant to the rm's current price-setting decision. The present discounted value of the rm's prots are multiplied by e (s t) , the probability that the price set in t will still be in place at time s. The rm discounts prots accruing at time s using the pricing kernel e r(s t) (s) that results from the representative household's optimization problem. This kernel is deterministic because households are assumed to be able to insure against rm-specic risks by holding a portfolio containing shares from all rms in the economy. The rm chooses P j (t) so as to maximize (P j ), subject to the constraint that sales are demand determined: y(m j ) Y d d P j P : 16 Yun's model is a variation of Calvo's (1983) model in which rms are assumed to set prices so as to maximize the present value of prots, instead of following a rule of thumb as assumed by Calvo. The rst-order condition associated with this optimization problem is ds; (61) where, as in section 3, < 1 denotes the price elasticity of the demand faced by an individual rm and is assumed to be constant. The expression within square brackets is the dierence between marginal revenue and marginal cost. Thus, the rm chooses to set today's price so that on average marginal revenue equals marginal cost.
Equilibrium
We show in the appendix that in equilibrium this rst-order condition gives rise to the following aggregate supply equation (42)), it follows that the determinants of the Jacobian matrices of the Rotemberg and Calvo models have the same sign. This implies that the results on local indeterminacy under passive monetary policy are identical under both models. Furthermore, by an analysis similar to the one carried out in section 3, it is possible to show that, like A 22 ,Ã 22 may take either sign. This is important because it implies that, like the Rotemberg model, the Calvo model can generate local indeterminacy under active monetary policy (regardless of the stance of scal policy). This result is entirely due to the assumption that money aects real variables through production. As mentioned earlier, in the Calvo model without money in the production function, the trace of the Jacobian is always positive and equal to r.
Conclusion
In this paper we h a v e shown that the implications of particular interest rate feedback rules for the determinacy of equilibrium depend not only on the scal policy regime but also on the structure of preferences and technologies. An important consequence of this nding is that the design of monetary policy should be guided not just by the stance of scal policy but also by the knowledge of the deep structural parameters describing preferences and technologies, which signicantly complicates the task of the monetary policy maker. In a symmetric equilibrium all rms that receive a price-change signal will choose the same price. Let this price be denoted by P(t). Let p(t) P ( t ) =P(t). Then equation (61) 
Using equations (58) and (66) Finally, use this expression to eliminate (m pj m p ) from (67) to get (62).
